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Three profound changes – the mortality, fertility and contraception transitions – char-
acterized the Victorian era in England. Economists, following Becker (1960), focus on the
first two and underplay the third by assuming couples can achieve their fertility target at
no cost. The historical experience from Victorian England is at odds with this view of cost-
less fertility regulation. We incorporate costly fertility limitation into the Becker paradigm:
in our story, the mortality transition spurs on a contraception revolution which, in turn,
makes it possible for the fertility transition to arrive. In the model, generationally-linked
households with heterogeneous income choose between two contraception strategies, one
“traditional”, the other “modern”. The modern comes with a higher fixed cost (reflecting
social opposition and informational barriers characteristic of the times), but has a lower
variable cost when it comes to averting childbirths. While the initial adopters of the mod-
ern technology are the rich – those unfazed by the higher fixed cost – eventually everyone
switches so as to economize on the variable cost. What hastens the switch is the decline in
child mortality. Increased adoption of modern contraception unleashes a social diffusion
process causing more people to switch, lowering fertility further and across all socioeco-
nomic groups. Themodel is consistent with broad time-series and cross-sectional patterns
of the English fertility transition.
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1 Introduction
The Victorian period represents a major turning point in the population history of England.
Demographers informus of three profound, unrelenting transformations originating in this pe-
riod. First came themortality transition: life expectancy at birth rose from near 40 by 1830 to 50
by 1900. Much of this progress touched the lives of children: a newborn during 1861-70 had a
27.9% chance of dying before reaching age five, by 1911-20 only 16.5%. Then followed the fertil-
ity transition. Marriages in 1860, when they lasted twenty years or more, produced on average
6.16 births; by 1915, that number had declined to 2.43. Accompanying these revolutionary tran-
sitions was a third, the somewhat overlooked contraception transition. By the late nineteenth
century, marital fertility rates had started to decline in every maternal group except the 20-24
age group (Woods, 2000). There is indirect evidence of birth control in a deliberate attempt
to stop childbearing after having one or two children: 32.9% of women born during 1840-69
had two or fewer children (live births) ever, compared to 57.5% of women born during 1870-99
(Hinde, 2003, Table 13.2).1 Inspired by these and other features of the English experience, we
propose a theory where the three transitions become causally entwined: the mortality transi-
tion triggers the contraception transition, which in turn, makes the fertility transition possible.
Economists have long sought to explain the emergence and persistence of the fertility tran-
sition. Their search has minimized the contribution of the contraception transition and, in
more recent work, questioned the role of the mortality transition (Galor, 2011). The dominant
paradigmof fertility implicitly assumes that couples perform a cost-benefit analysis to compute
their fertility target and achieve that target at no cost (Becker, 1960). The contraception revolu-
tion is viewed as a side show, a mere reflection of changes in the demand for children.2 More
generally, these theories can accommodate costly fertility regulation as long as the cost is rela-
tively small and does not change systematically over time or across people. Neither assumption
is justified for the English transition. Even though traditional methods of contraception were
known for centuries, that information was not widely available nor always precise. That illegit-
imate fertility fell in conjunction with marital fertility during England’s transition indicates the
means to achieve fertility targets changed (Knodel and van deWalle, 1986). Secondly, late nine-
teenth century England saw significant institutional resistance, from the clergy and themedical
profession, to the practice of fertility control within marriage. Both would have made the goal
of attaining a fertility target challenging. Third, these costs abated over the course of the English
1While change in nuptiality, the proportion of women marrying, was a proximate determinant of fertility un-
til the eighteenth century, it had little explanatory power for the nineteenth century fertility decline. Similarly,
changes in the distribution of age at marriage were too minor to play much of a role.
2Becker (1991) writes that standard economic theories “appear sufficient to explain major declines in fertility,
and simple and sufficiently effective birth control methods have been available to produce these declines” (p.141).
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transition as information about and access to fertility control became available and the very no-
tion ofmarital fertility regulation became acceptable. Given these significant and varying costs,
it is essential to place contraception at the center of the historical fertility transition.
In our model the household’s Beckerian cost-benefit analysis of fertility is expanded to in-
clude social influence as well as the cost of achieving that fertility via specific contraception
strategies. Left unhindered, the biological process will produce children in conformity with
“natural fertility”. If fewer children are desired, this biological process has to be restrained
through contraception, with associated costs and benefits. We show that for a given contracep-
tion strategy, an exogenous decline in childmortality causes a decline in both childbirths (TFR)
and surviving children (NFR). The latter is true only when income crosses a threshold, and once
that happens, families start to make investments in the quality of their offspring. This is impor-
tant for the following reason. A key pillar of historical demographic transitions is that declines
in TFR andNFR often followed declines in childmortality. Simple versions of the Beckermodel,
with homothetic preferences, have trouble delivering this link. This has been noted by Doepke
(2005) andmore recently Galor (2011). In fact Galor (2011) uses it to pass an indictment against
such a causal link. Our model is able to deliver this link since costly fertility control naturally
gives rise to non-homothetic preferences over the number of children.
In the dynamic version of our model, we allow for persistent intra- and inter-generational
income heterogeneity across households in order to account for the cross-sectional differences
in fertility behavior before, during and after the English transition (Clark, 2005). We also per-
mit households to choose between two birth control strategies: a traditional method (abortion,
infanticide, abstinence, breast-feeding) and a more efficient, modern one (appliances for ex-
ample). Associated with each strategy are costs that, for convenience, take the form of utility
loss alone. We posit that while the modern strategy comes with a higher fixed cost (social op-
position, informational barriers), it has a lower variable cost (more effective) when it comes
to averting childbirths. We model the social diffusion of contraception adoption as a random
matching process that brings together adopters and those yet to adopt, similar to Munshi and
Myaux (2006). While the initial adopters of the modern method are the rich – those who are
not dissuaded by the associated higher fixed cost – eventually everyone switches to themodern
technology so as to economize on the variable cost. What hastens the switch is the decline in
child mortality. In addition, adoption of modern contraception unleashes a diffusion process
that lowers its fixed cost over time. More people switch, further lowering the TFR and NFR. Our
calibrated model generates these features in line with the English fertility transition.
In explaining the fertility transition, economists typically focus on a trigger, a key factor,
that can explain its onset. For Becker (1960), rapid industrialization and urbanization circa
mid-nineteenth century generated strong wage and income growth which raised the oppor-
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tunity time-cost of children and triggered the switch from quantity to quality of children. For
others, the acceleration in the rate of technological progress during this period increased the
role of human capital in production and triggered households to have fewer but higher quality
children (see Galor, 2005, 2011, for an overview of this research).
While childmortality triggers the English fertility transition in ourmodel, our theory ismore
general in that it can include other factors such as income growth and, potentially, endogenous
technological change. The dynamic model incorporates income growth from exogenous pro-
ductivity improvement. This income growth can, over time, take the economy from a Malthu-
sian to a post-Malthusian to a modern equilibrium. Along the way, the cross-sectional corre-
lation between household income and fertility goes from being positive to negative. The lower
demand for children, from the post-Malthusian phase onwards, means a latent demand for fer-
tility regulationwhich households are able to act uponwhen income crosses a threshold and/or
child mortality rates fall. In other words, income growth alone can generate contraception and
fertility transitions in the model. Our quantitative assessment shows, however, that England’s
steep child mortality decline was more instrumental in its ensuing fertility transition than in-
come growth. This is not to deny the relevance of income or human capital as triggers in other
societies, particularly where it is unclear whether or not the mortality transition preceded the
fertility transition. Our quantitative work also shows that though contraception by itself could
not have triggered the fertility transition, it was a vital link between England’s mortality and
fertility transitions.
Beyond the relevance of our work for historical, and possibly modern, transitions (see Sec-
tion 7), this papermakes several theoretical contributions. It shows that costly contraception in
the Becker model can generate a link from child mortality to total and net fertility rates without
relying on subsistence constraints that may not have applied to all socio-economic groups in
nineteenth century England (Galor, 2005; Clark, 2005), that pre-transition economies are char-
acterized by a positive cross-sectional correlation between household income and fertility, a
correlation that turns negative during the transition as wealthier households adopt costlier but
more efficient methods of contraception.
Some facts about the English transition are outlined in Section 2 below. Section 3 specifies
a dynastic model where households care about the quantity and quality of children and face
costly fertility regulation. The static and dynamic equilibria are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5
specifies the process of diffusion by which households switch to a more efficient contraception
technology. Section 6 parameterizes the model. Based on observed declines in child mortality
and indirect evidence on fertility regulation in late nineteenth century England, we show that
the predicted fertility transition broadly fits the time-series of the English transition. Section 7
discusses the applicability of our model to more recent transitions.
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2 The Fertility Transition in England &Wales
In his tome, The Demographic Transition, Chesnais (1992) lays out three central propositions
that capture major demographic transitions: (i) the chronological sequence of the transition,
mortality decline, followed by fertility decline3, (ii) a general restriction of marriages followed
by a limitation of births, and (iii) the context of modernization – the overarching trends in soci-
eties evolving from traditional, agrarian to modern, urban forms – and their effect on the onset
of fertility decline. The English demographic transition, as we describe below, fits these propo-
sitions reasonably well.
2.1 The Englishmortality and fertility declines
Figure 1 illustrates the transitions inmortality and fertility. Themeasure ofmortality used in the
figure is child mortality rate (CMR), the probability of death between ages 0-5, data for which
goes back only to 1841. As the upper panel shows, CMR remained high until the 1860s, after
which it started to fall steeply.4 This was part of a broader progress in mortality that was con-
fined to those between the ages of one and forty: mortality in these age groups fell by nearly
50% in the 1890s compared to their levels in the 1830s. Immunization against small pox and
other diseases, improvements in sanitation and public health, all played significant roles in this
mortality decline. This account of English mortality is largely agreed upon by demographers
who use it to place the onset of the child mortality transition somewhere in the mid-to-late
nineteenth century.
The onset of England and Wales’ – indeed much of Europe’s, France being a major outlier –
fertility transition has been dated by demographers to somewhere in the 1870s (Figure 1) or a
bit later (Chesnais, 1992, Table 4.3). The decline in the total fertility rate that we see in the upper
panel of Figure 1 was accompanied by a decline in net fertility (lower panel). Fertility did de-
cline earlier in the nineteenth century, between 1811-20 and 1846, but then remained steady for
three decades until the 1870s when it started on its path of precipitous and consistent decline.
The principal driver of that earlier decline was nuptiality, changes in the age and incidence of
marriage. Abortion and infanticide may have also been practiced (Caldwell, 1999).
Consistent with Chesnais’s second proposition, the English fertility transition represented a
shift in fertility behavior from the extensivemargin (nuptiality) to the intensivemargin (fertility
3Some authors have noted that France, and possibly Belgium and Germany, were exceptions to this. Chesnais
(1992) makes a persuasive case for otherwise.
4Hinde (2003, p. 195), using a different yardstick, life expectancy at birth, for which longer time series are avail-
able, argues that the English mortality transition went through three phases: there was a “definite, though rather
modest” decline during 1780-1830, followed by stagnation during the mid nineteenth century, and finally, a sec-
ond “decisive” period of decline starting in the 1860s. The expectation of life at birth was roughly 35 years in 1750
and reached 40 years by 1830 (and stayed there till the 1870s); thereafter it rose faster, reaching 60 years by 1930.
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regulation within marriage), a transition from ‘natural’ fertility to controlled fertility. Fertility
limitation now depended on the number of children a couple already had, reflecting a con-
scious choice and ability to restrict family size. Average completed family size of ever-married
women fell from over 7 for birth cohorts 1826-31 to about 4 for cohorts 1891-96 (Hinde, 2003).
32% of women born in 1840-69 had completed family size of fewer than three children (live
births), compared to roughly 56% of women born in 1870-99, suggesting some sort of deliber-
ate family limitation was being pursued. Reher (1999) views this period of history as a break
from the past. For the first time, faced with the reality of low child mortality, couples made
the decision to “give individual choice priority over social norms and ended up curtailing their
fertility...[The] entire context of social, economic and cultural modernization contributed to
people’s willingness to adopt new strategies when faced with new realities, but intuitively the
point of departure would seem to have been incipient mortality transformation.”
What of Chesnais’s first proposition? Chesnais makes a prima facie case mortality declines
in portions of western Europe preceded fertility declines by at least a century, the implication
being the mortality decline had little to do with the fertility decline. However, after account-
ing for data limitations, wide variability in declines, and exceptions such as France, Chesnais
comes to the tempered conclusion that declines in mortality “seem to be necessary” for the
fertility transition but “hardly sufficient” (p. 149). Reher (2009) is far more sanguine: “Nearly
everywhere mortality decline preceded fertility decline. Child mortality was the first to decline,
followed somewhat later by declines in infant mortality”.
For our purposes, it is of some importance that the mortality decline preceded and hence,
could have instigated, the subsequent fertility decline. The exact length of the delay is of sec-
ondary concern. Our theory below can also generate a fertility transition from income growth
alone, just not one that fits the English experience as well as mortality decline does. For other
countries, it is possible that income or human capital could have been the trigger. Clark (2005)
ponders a similar question. He argues that higher social class and gross fertility were negatively
associated in late nineteenth century England. Using wills, testators and survivors data, he
find a positive association between income and net fertility in pre-transition England and con-
cludes that “this positive association between fertility and income [in pre-industrial England]
seemingly becomes negative in the period of the demographic transition”.
2.2 The Costs of Contraception
Knowledge about birth control goes back to several centuries. Hippocratic texts of the late fifth
and fourth century BCE contain details about controlling the biology of procreation and, even
earlier, the withdrawal method was discussed as a means to avoid conception (McLaren 1991,
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Kohler, 2001). Despite this, centuries-old knowledge of some methods of contraception was
never widely diffused, nor were such forms of contraception widely practiced. Sources often
presented medically reliable techniques right next to magical recipes, sowing more confusion
than informing. Moreover, while the birth control movement of nineteenth century drew on
this centuries-old knowledge, its immediate source were Islamic texts, indicating the lack of
accessible European sources (Peel, 1964).
Books extolling the virtues and rational methods of birth control started appearing in Eng-
land in the early nineteenth century. For a while these had little impact on fertility behavior
or public opinion. In his book The Fruits of Philosophy published in 1832 in Massachusetts,
Charles Knowlton discussed the effectiveness of douching as a new method of birth control
and informed readers about the physiology of conception and treatments for fertility and im-
potence. It too had little immediate impact. It was only in 1876, when the English fertility
transition was just unfolding and the book was republished in England that it became enor-
mously controversial and popular. The publishers Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh were
indicted on grounds of publishing “lewd, filthy, bawdy and obscene” material and sentenced
to imprisonment which was later overturned on appeal. The attention garnered by the case
raised awareness and sales of the book shot up from a few hundred to thousands per year. More
publications on birth control followed in the subsequent decades, many promoting relatively
easy to use, at-home,methods (Hinde, 2003). Not all such literature was reliable. Many pseudo-
scientific handbills and pamphlets were from quacks. McLaren (1991) concludes that “the cir-
culation of the quacks’ literature was in addition (to the expansion in publishing facilities) an
indication of the public’s continuing desire for some type of instruction on procreation” (p. 80).
There is evidence that in most regions of England, marital fertility was lowered through
“stopping” behavior. This was primarily achieved through more frequent usage of abstention
and the withdrawal method. The latter was particularly responsible for the sharp reductions
in working class fertility achieved during 1880-1910 (McLaren, 1991). Contraceptive devices,
on the other hand, were not widely used initially. Condoms and spermicides were not widely
available and too expensive until the twentieth century.5 Secondly, ignorance and unreliable
promises made by the penny press made people more skeptical of these devices. Many women
perceived them to be physically harmful, a perception aggravated bymedical advice. Condoms,
on the other hand, were associated in the popular mind with prostitution and the prevention of
STDs (Seccombe, 1990).
A major hurdle to the democratization of birth control in English society was the deep-
5Considerable advancements in reproductive technology happened at the start of the twentieth century. By the
1920s, caps and diaphragms started to become widely available in birth control clinics. Then came spermicidal
pessaries, sheaths, and finally, by early 1930s, the latex condom (Fisher and Szreter, 2003).
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seated resistance from themedical profession and, less surprisingly, theChurch. When a former
primeminister Lord John Russell publicly spoke in favor of doctors providing guidance on fam-
ily limitation, he was widely condemned by themedical press. Themedical community labeled
family limitation as folk medicine practiced by quacks and midwives. Others went further. Dr
Charles H. F. Routh, an influential gynecologist at the Samaritan Hospital for Women and Chil-
dren, railed against contraception as a great moral crime and blamed it for a long list of serious
physiological harm and psychological problems. As late as 1901, an editorial in the BritishMed-
ical Journal labelled it as “unnatural and degrading...and oft injurious to both husband and
wife” (Soloway, 1982).
Requests for information about contraceptives were regularly rebuffed by public health pro-
fessionals including nurses and pharmacists and, aggravating matters, physicians failed “to
make a distinction between abortifacients and contraceptives” (Seccombe, 1992). Indeedmany
doctors felt it was their duty to prevent the spread of contraceptive knowledge and devices. Cor-
respondents inMarie Stopes’Mother Englandmention that doctors had refused to inform them
about contraceptive devices, even as theywarned patients of the dangers of further pregnancies
(Secombe, 1992). McLaren (1991) cites the writing of one doctor: “It was not the doctor’s duty
. . . to instruct laymen on the details of procreation for such information might be then used to
escape the punishment ordained by God for sexual misdemeanours” (p. 80).
The Church, both Protestant and Catholic, reinforced this opposition to any form of con-
traception until 1930 (Szreter, 1996). Religious doctrines of the times proscribed couples from
“engaging in any act which would hinder the natural power of procreating life” and rejected
appliance-based methods on the grounds they tampered with “nature or God’s will” (Fisher,
2006). In many cases, the clergy simply ignored or avoided the topic: “they don’t talk about it in
church...[yet] everybody that goes to church knows...you’re not supposed to use contraceptives”
(Fisher, 2006, p. 152).
Given the nature of religious and, particularly,medical resistance to the idea of birth control,
the adoption of stopping behavior and family limitation would have been socially costly in late
nineteenth century England. They would have been privately costly as well. Certain methods
like the rhythm method were unavailable as the precise timing of ovulation was not known.
For working classes, contraceptives were expensive items. Female contraceptive devices were
especially so, requiring clinical help and being subject to the risk of infection in the absence
of indoor plumbing. The main methods used were thus abortion, the withdrawal method and
abstinence, all of which would have been psychologically costly to practice, compounded by
the perceived health andmoral failings associated with them (Seccombe, 1990).6
6For abortion, in particular, there seems to have been a great lack of safe options. Roughly 16-20% of pregnan-
cies were aborted in the 1920s, increasingly by married women.
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2.3 Diffusion
The English fertility decline broadly followed socio-economic lines with the fertility differential
across social and occupational categories widening in the early days of the transition. The de-
cline started among the upper and middle classes where women marrying in the 1880s were
having 3.8 children compared to 6.3 for those who had married in the 1860s (Woods, 2000, Ta-
ble 4.1, age at marriage 20-24). Even though fertility fell in successive marriage cohorts for all
socio-economic groups, the faster decline among urban propertied classes opened up a fertil-
ity differential. By the late nineteenth century, working-class fertility started falling noticeably,
first among Yorkshire and Lancashire’s textile workers many of whom were married women,
then among other working-classes well into the twentieth century (Seccombe, 1990; Haines,
1992).
Many demographers see this pattern of differential fertility transition as indicative of social
diffusion, as “the new reproductive habits began to spread (from theupper- andmiddle-classes)
amongst the less privileged social groups” (Woods, 2000, p. 114, quoting from the work of J. A.
Banks). This view of social diffusion was reinforced by the European Fertility Project’s findings
that fertility decline often followed religious and linguistic lines across economically disparate
regions of the continent.
Szreter’s (1992) reinterpretation of the English data modifies Banks’ hypothesis. The pro-
cess of diffusion and absorption of new reproductive norms, Szreter argues, could not have
been as simple as copying the family limitation practices of the upper- and middle-classes by
lower socio-economic groups. If this were the dominant process of diffusion, one would have
expected female domestic servants hired in upper- andmiddle-class families to have beenma-
jor agents of change. The evidence, however, suggests women in domestic service were socially
isolated and least likely to acquire knowledge of sexualmatters. Instead, any diffusion of behav-
ior would have worked through job expectations: “as the servant-employing class itself found
it increasingly necessary to restrict its own family size...it may well have adjusted downwards,
either consciously or not, its tolerance for large families among its resident servants” (Szreter,
1992, p. 479).7
Family limitation behavior of the upper- and middle-classes may have, however, indirectly
affected the behavior of other classes. As we pointed out earlier, social activism and the ar-
rival of new literature on birth control increasingly placed family limitation in the popular con-
sciousness. That a couple could choose to restrict family size, an idea that would have alien just
a few decades earlier, gained popularity and feasible by the late nineteenth century. Diffusion,
in this case, took the form of social influence.
7This motivates our formalization of contraception adoption as an arms-length process of diffusion from early
to late adopters.
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Where social learning, the diffusion of knowledge about birth control, played a role was
within some socio-economic groups. In her reviewofMarie Stopes’ correspondencewithworking-
class women soliciting birth control information, Seccombe (1990, 1992) offers convincing ev-
idence of this. Working-class women acquired knowledge of contraceptives through word of
mouth. The main hurdles were not so much a stigma against discussing these as ignorance
about contraception and a taboo against the use of artificial means to restrict fertility within
marriage. Many of Stopes’ correspondents were fearful of the side effects of contraception in
general and “preventatives”in particular while others were unsure where to find contraceptives
since they were not yet sold over the counter in local shops.
3 TheModel
Demographers classify theories of the fertility transition in two categories, “innovation-based”
and “adjustment-based”(see Hinde, 2003, Ch. 13). In the former view, for example in the find-
ings of the European Fertility Project, a sharp distinction is drawn between pre-transition com-
munities where most people found the very idea of family limitation inconceivable and subse-
quent post-transition communities where the question, “howmany children should we have?”
was routinely asked and answered (Woods, 2000, p. 169). In this view, the transition is pre-
cipitated by a social innovation, the widespread recognition of the notion that family limita-
tion does lie in the realm of conscious action. Proponents of this view argue fertility behavior
changed as a consequence of this social innovation and, in turn, fostered increased adoption of
contraception over time and space.
Adjustment-based theories, on the other hand, highlight how socio-economic changes such
as increased urbanization and industrialization lowered the demand for children and, in re-
sponse, families welcomed birth control into their fertility calculus. Adjustment-based theories
– what economists call the demand-side view – assume, however, a household’s fertility objec-
tive is achieved at little or no cost. They also assume family limitation was always part of the
realm of conscious action: if prevailing socio-economic conditions justified high fertility, fam-
ily limitation, even when available, would not have been adopted. The evidence from Victo-
rian England we have presented in Section 2.2 suggests that actively regulating marital fertility
would have been financially and psychologically costly in the face of social opposition, scarce
information and non-availability of reliable external devices. Hence, in our view, any plausible
account of the historical fertility transition needs to recognize these restrictions (see the con-
clusion for a discussion of how this relates to modern fertility transitions).
The theory we propose is an amalgam of the innovation and adjustment hypotheses. Dif-
fusion of the notion of fertility control alone cannot explain the onset of the English transition.
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That fertility started falling across all socio-economic groups from the 1870s – groups with very
different birth-control adoption rates – suggests an underlying common cause that necessitated
a need for smaller families. In our model, declining child mortality across all income groups is
that common cause, one which lowers the demand for children and motivates the need for an
adjustment in fertility objectives. Initially-available birth control methods are not as effective
in achieving those objectives and adoption of more effective methods involves hefty switching
costs. Richer households are the first to respond: they reduce family size by switching to more
efficient forms of birth control, despite the high cost. These costs fall over time as information
about modern methods becomes widely available and social opposition to their use in marital
fertility regulation abates. As child mortality and fertility limitation costs keep falling, effective
fertility control becomes a no-brainer for more and more households. The fertility transition,
ultimately, sweeps through all rungs of the socio-economic ladder as economy-wide fertility
reaches near-replacement levels.
We start by developing the basic model for a given birth control technology, with social dif-
fusion shut down (until we reach Section 5). The starting point of our model is the eve of the
fertility transition. In the model economy, the social innovation discussed above has already
happened, that is, family limitation is firmly in the fertility consciousness of agents and tra-
ditional forms of birth control have been adopted. Child mortality, the common-cause, the
adjustment, is about to sharply decline.
3.1 Basics
Consider a single-good economy consisting of an infinite sequence of three period-lived over-
lapping generations of agents. The three stages of life are childhood, adulthood and old age. At
each date t = 1,2, ..,1, a continuum of agents (children) with mass nt is born to existing adults.
An exogenous fraction,¡t , of them survive to adulthood.
8 In childhood, agents are passive; they
simply acquire human capital, which is paid for by their parents. As young adults, they become
active decision-makers: they work, determine their family size and strategies to achieve that,
spend time and resources raising children, invest in their schooling, consume, and save for old
age. Everyone retires in old age and consumes all wealth before dying.
Adults are endowedwith one unit of timewhich they allocate betweenwork and raising chil-
dren. Adults differ in their labor productivity. Specifically, they are heterogeneous on a single
innate, unobserved dimension which, for convenience, we call ability. Ability " is drawn identi-
cally and independently across adults (and across generations) from a cumulative distribution
8Henceforth,¡will be dubbed the child survival rate and 1°¡ the childmortality rate. We implicitly assume¡ is
revealed early in childhood, before parental investments are made. Anyone who survives to adulthood is assumed
to survive till the end of old age.
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G [", "¯] with positive support ("¯ > " > 0) and an unconditional mean of unity. An adult’s ability
draw is realized upon joining the labor market. If a child’s parent invests xt°1 units of goods in
her education, similar to Moav (2005), her human capital as an adult (at the beginning of t ), qt ,
is given by
qt =Q(xt°1)¥ a(1+xt°1)æ, a > 0, æ 2 (0,1). (1)
This human capital, combined with her ability, produces labormarket income. For a child born
at t ° 1 whose ability "i is realized as an adult at t , “full income” in period t is given by vi t ¥
"i qtwt , where wt is the competitive wage rate per efficiency unit of labor.
The combined savings of adult-workers gets converted into the future aggregate capital
stock, K , which depreciates fully upon use and earns a return Ωt+1 between t and t + 1. The





t , At > 0, µ 2 (0,1) where At =
°
1+ g ¢At°1 and g ∏ 0 is the fixed rate of exogenous TFP
growth. If g > 0, TFP grows over time causingw to grow, which in turn, causes vi t to trend. Until
further notice we set g = 0 and At = A 8t .
3.2 Contraception technology
As noted before, demand-side models in the Beckerian tradition assume households’ desired
fertility can be costlessly implemented and without regard to social influences. Departing from
this tradition, wemodel family limitation as a conscious albeit costly attempt to control fertility
(Michael and Willis, 1976; Easterlin, 1975), one susceptible to social pulls. In our setup, the
household’s Beckerian trade-offs are adjusted further to respect the cost of achieving its fertility
target. Our formulation is related to Easterlin (1975) and Easterlin et al.’s (1980) “synthesis”
model of fertility wherein a household faces costly fertility regulation and a child production
function (“supply” of births). Unlike us, Easterlin treats the availability and use of contraception
methods as exogenous, and does not consider the transition from ‘natural’ to controlled fertility
as arising from the mortality decline and ensuing social change.
The details are as follows. Left unfettered, the biological process of procreation is assumed
to produce ¥ children in any household. Here ¥ corresponds to natural fecundity which de-
pends on biological factors and possibly social factors such as nuptiality and age at marriage.
This is taken to be exogenous as our focus is on the intensive margin of fertility regulation. If
a household wishes to attain a fertility level lower than ¥, the biological process has to be sub-
jected to active birth control through the adoption of a contraception strategy.
We distinguish between two contraception strategies: a readily-available, traditional strat-
egy and amore efficient,modern one. It is convenient to think of the latter as “appliance-based”,
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caps, condoms, diaphragms, pessaries and the like. But recall from above that the English tran-
sition initially relied on methods such as withdrawal that had been known for much longer.
What was different was a new attitude towards fertility regulation. Even though the withdrawal
method is easy to comprehend with our modern attitudes, in a society where it had been prac-
ticed sparingly, the biology of procreation ill understood, and physicians routinely blurred the
distinction between abortion and contraception, it is not hard to imagine that it would have
been significantly costly to adopt. As such we club together this newly adopted withdrawal
method with newly available appliance-based methods and label them modern. The tradi-
tional method of birth control should then be interpreted as interventions such as abortion or
longer duration breast-feeding. Associated with each strategy are costs that, for convenience,
take the form of utility loss alone.9 While some strategies are costly in terms of diminished sex-
ual satisfaction or lack of spontaneity, others bring about real or imagined decreases in physical
health, require sacrifice of religious principles, or involve an embarrassing search for reliable
information about their implementation and availability.
Let j 2 {1,2} denote contraception strategies where the first strategy (technology) is identi-
fied with the traditional method, the second with the modern method. Let Æ j ∏ 0 be a fixed
cost while e j denotes how faithfully the adult household employs strategy j . The utility cost of
adopting contraceptive strategy j 2 {1,2} is ° j ¥ °(e j )=Æ j +
°
e j
¢2 where the second term repre-
sents a convex ‘variable cost’. Higher values of e enable the household tomore effectively attain




depends on social influence. For now, it is enough to note that Æ2 >Æ1 in a society on the cusp
of fertility regulation.
Contraception strategy j is associated with the child production function
h j (e)¥ ¥
0B@1° eq
∏ j
1CA , 0∑ e ∑q∏ j ,
where we have dropped the subscript on e. If contraception is not practiced by the household,
no births are prevented and ¥ children are necessarily born: h j (0) = ¥. Since @h j (e)/@e < 0,
more intensive implementation of j via higher e lowers the number of children relative to ¥.
Also note that @h j (e)/@e, the marginal efficiency of contraception method j , depends on ∏ j . A
higher value of ∏ j , ceteris paribus, makes technology j less effective at averting births. Hence-
forth, we refer to ∏ as the ineffectiveness of a contraception strategy and assume ∏1 > ∏2. For
a given e, more births are averted with technology 2 (the modern one) than with technology 1
9The Lewis-Faning survey found only 1.4% of the non-appliance method users referred to the monetary cost of
appliance methods as being the chief deterrent to their use. (Fisher, 2006; p. 143)
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(the traditional one) as illustrated in Figure 2a.
After invertingh(e j ) and substituting into° j , rewrite the utility cost of contraceptionmethod
j as





, Æ j ∏ 0, 0∑ n < ¥ (2)
a decreasing and convex function of childbirth. For a given technology, as the need for lower n











; 0∑∏2 <∏1; Æ1 <Æ2
implying technology 2 is more effective (has lower variable cost) at averting births than tech-
nology 1 but comes with a higher initial fixed cost. For example, in Figure 2b, °2 (n) and °1 (n)
are shown to cross; the former is higher at ¥ and the latter is higher at some n0. These differ-
ences underlie some of the results we obtain later. While the initial adopters of the modern,
appliance-based technology are the rich – those who are not fazed by the associated higher
fixed cost, Æ2 – eventually everyone switches to the modern technology so as to economize on
the variable cost.10
With a slight abuse of notation, henceforth, the utility cost of restricting fertility using con-
traception strategy j will be denoted ° j (n), an increasing and convex function of the number of
births avoided through contraception.
3.3 Preferences
Adult households view children as consumption goods and derive direct utility from the num-
ber of surviving children, ¡tnt . Following Galor and Weil (2000), Greenwood and Seshadri
(2002) and many others, parents are assumed to be imperfectly altruistic, receiving a warm-
glow from the average human capital (earning potential), ¡tnt qt+1, of their surviving children.
Parents make their investment subsequent to child survival and care only about the expected
human capital of the child, that is, they ignore uncertainty with respect to child ability. In addi-
tion, they care about their own consumption in adulthood and old-age, denoted by c1t and c2t+1
respectively. An adult agent-household i at date t employing contraceptive method j derives
10Ostensibly, our formulation appears similar to a quadratic norm over fertility, that is the cost of deviating one’s
fertility choice from the social norm, captured by some average n¯, is (n° n¯)2. But typically such formulations, see
Palivos (2001) for example, rely on births not survivors. For us the relevant deviation is ¥°n, births averted from a
state of natural fertility.
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utility V ji t where
















°º° j (nit ) (3)
where u, y and H are strictly increasing and strictly concave functions. We take these functions
to be logarithmic and reformulate (3) to
V ji t ¥ lnci1t +Ø lnci2t+1+∞µ ln(¡tnit )+∞(1°µ) lnqit+1°º° j (nit ) (4)
where Ø> 0, ∞ 2 (0,1), µ 2 (0,1) and º 2 {0,1} is an indicator function. When º= 0, only the well-
known Beckerian calculus is operative and achieving desired fertility is costless. When º = 1,
the household’s fertility is the outcome of a birth-control technology. It can, with certainty,
have any number
°
n < ¥¢ of children it desires but now, besides the Beckerian quantity-quality
concerns, it must take into account the cost of achieving its desired fertility.11
Two points bear emphasis here. First, one must not think of the Beckerian calculus as, in
some sense, preceding the contraception calculus. In the model, the contraception calculus
is omnipresent; households do not face a choice between adoption and non-adoption of con-
traception. In Section 5 below, they will entertain the possibility of switching from traditional
forms of birth control to modern ones. Second, rejecting the contraception calculus unfailingly
implies n = ¥. Of course it is possible that families choose n = ¥, in effect behaving “as if” they
had not adopted contraception. We rule this out via Assumption 1d below.
3.4 The household’s problem
For now abstract from ability heterogeneity and the choice between alternative contraception
strategies and, as such, suppress the i and j superscripts. Assume everyone has already adopted
the natural method of contraception. Each adult household allocates its time endowment be-
tweenmarket activity –which brings in income vt for each unit of labor time – and child rearing.
Each surviving child requires parental nurture and care of ø 2 (0,1) units of time, ±> 0 units of
goods, and possibly an additional x units of goods of the parents’ choosing in schooling invest-
ment. Time-cost and goods-cost of child rearing are distinct and not equivalent. Let st denote
saving and Rt+1 be the gross one-period return on period-t saving. A typical adult-household,
taking vt as pre-determined and ¡t and Rt+1 as parametric, solves the following program at
11In this setup, with continuous fertility, birth control implies stopping not spacing behavior: households use




{st ,nt ,xt }
Vt ¥ lnc1t +Ø lnc2t+1+∞µ ln(¡tnt )+∞(1°µ) lnqt+1°º°(nt ) (5)
subject to the budget constraints
c1t + st = (1°ø¡tnt )vt °±¡tnt °¡tnt xt , (6)
c2t+1 = Rt+1st , (7)
equations (1) and (2) and the additional constraints
c1t ∏ 0, c2t+1 ∏ 0, st ∏ 0, ¥∏ nt ∏ 0, xt ∏ 0.
Note that costs of child rearing and direct utility from children depend on the number of sur-
viving children, hence on ¡. In contrast, the cost of contraception is independent of ¡ since it
depends on the number of childbirths.
Logarithmic preferences imply that non-negativity constraints for consumption (hence, sav-
ing) and fertility will not bind in equilibrium. The household may, however, choose to have ¥
children (n = ¥) or not invest in child quality (x = 0). Denoting the Langrangemultipliers associ-















ø¡t vt +¡t (±+xt )
(1°ø¡tnt )vt °±¡tnt °¡tnt xt ° st




(1°ø¡tnt )vt °±¡tnt °¡tnt xt ° st
, &x ∏ 0, &xxt = 0 (10)
for st , nt and xt respectively. We introduce a few parameter restrictions.
Assumption 1 For all t ∏ 1, assume that
(a) vt > (1°±)/ø¥ vmin












Part (a) ensures that income is high enough to afford children. Below we show it also guar-
antees a tradeoff between c1t and nt . Since the budget constraint can turn non-convex in the
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presence of both child quality and quantity, part (b) is sufficient to ensure second order con-
ditions hold (see appendix A for details). Such a parameter restriction is, by now, standard in
quantity-quality models of fertility (for example, Jones et al, 2008). Part (d) implies the child
survival rate corresponding to natural fecundity
°
n = ¥¢ is ¡min. By restricting ¡t 2 °¡min,1§, we
ensure n stays below ¥.12 The importance of part (c) is clarified later.
3.5 Some Intuition
Given the somewhat non-standard household preference, it is useful to build up some intuition
on how its works. Our focus is solely on two items, the income-expansion path and the con-






z ¥¡n¢. For convenience,
we drop the t , i and j subscripts here. Also, for the present, we ignore the saving decision. Start
with V ¥ u (c)+H(z), where u and H are strictly concave, with the corresponding budget con-
straint c = (1°øz)v°±z. This is a very basic setupwith no contraception andnoquality-quantity
trade-off – in short, a Malthusian, no-contraception regime (Galor, 2011, Section 3).
As in all models of fertility choice, the price of children pz ¥ ±+ øv is income-dependent
as children require both sacrifice of consumption goods and foregone labor income. Recall
that homothetic tastes can be represented by any utility function that has the mathematical
property of being homogeneous; also, for homothetic preferences, the ratio of demands for the
two goods is independent of income. Suppose, for example, u and H are each of the CES form,
i.e., u (d) = H (d) = d1°!/(1°!). Then optimality implies that z/c = (±+øv)°1/! – the relative
demand for children is monotonically falling in household full income as children are relatively
more expensive for richer households.
More generally, household optimality requires that u0 (c(z)) (øv +±) = H 0(z). Notice that ¡
is not an independent argument anywhere in this equation and, hence, any z that solves this
equation is independent of ¡. In other words, an increase in ¡ raises the marginal cost and
lowers the marginal benefit of surviving children proportionately. It follows ¡(@n/@¡)+n = 0
so the number of childbirths, n, is proportionately declining in ¡. A natural question would
be, is the independence of z from ¡ a consequence of the assumed homogeneity of u and H?
The answer is no. To break the homogeneity suppose that u (d) = d1°!1/(1°!1) and H (d) =
d1°!2/(1°!2). It is easy to check, even here, the optimal z is independent of ¡.
Galor (2011) argues a necessary condition for declines in mortality to lower surviving fer-
tility is a stochastic z. Faced with uncertain child survival, parents may hold a “buffer stock”
of children. We take an alternative route by adding a convex cost to achieving target fertil-
ity through contraception, ° (n). Suppose V ¥ u (c)+H(z)°° (n). The first order condition
12For interior x, it follows from (10) that ∞æ(1° µ)c1t = ¡nt (1+ xt ) implying n = 0, the other corner, is not a
possible optimum.
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is ¡H 0(z)°°0 (n) = ¡ (±+øv)u0(c(z)) where the marginal benefit of increasing fertility is now
higher because it requires households to less faithfully follow contraception. More importantly,
¡ is now an independent argument in this equation. While parents care only about the number
of surviving children, the cost of having them is incurred over the number of childbirths.
Finally, note that the quadratic form for ° (n) renders the lifetime utility function (5) non-
homogenous and non-homothetic. The presence of ° (n) breaks the homogeneity of V even
though the homogeneity of u and H are retained. This will play a role in shaping the income-
expansion path, helping generate the non-monotonicity discussed in Section 5 below.
4 Fertility Regimes
For the household’s decision problem specified above, we first characterize properties of the
fertility equilibrium at any given date t where xt > 0, then proceed to analyze settings in which
parents do not invest in child quality. A regimewith xt > 0 is labeledModern, while that without
child quality investment (xt = 0) is termedMalthusian.13
4.1 Modern regime
Such a regime is characterized by xt > 0 and nt < ¥. It applies to a point in time at which the
fertility transition is already under way, people are actively limiting births and investing in the
quality of their surviving children. Setting º = 1 and &n = 0 = &x in the first order conditions
(9)–(10), and after some rearrangement, we arrive at an equation that implicitly solves for the
household’s fertility choice,








vt ° (øvt +±°1)¡nt
∏
¥≠(nt ), (11)
where√ is as defined in Assumption 1(d), and the time-subscript on¡ has been dropped for the
present. Parameter restrictions in Assumption 1 ensure an unique solution to (11) at a positive
value of nt .14 At a first glance, the effects of child mortality and contraception effectiveness be-
come apparent: if either ¡!¡min or ∏!1, then n! ¥. In other words, faced with either very
13We call it so because, in the absence of child quality investment, child quantity is the sole focus of the house-
hold’s fertility calculus. In Section 6, we introduce exogenous TFP growth, g . In that setting, whatwe term “Malthu-
sian” corresponds more to the “post-Malthusian Regime” in Galor (2011).
14Briefly, Assumptions 1(a) and (d) ensure that the right hand side of this equation is positive. The left hand side
¢(nt ) is decreasing in nt under Assumption 1(b) and the capacity constraint, while the right hand side ≠(nt ) is
increasing in nt under Assumption 1(a) and (d). Moreover limn!0¢(n) =1 while ≠(0) > 0. The interior fertility
choice is given by the unique intersection point.
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low child survival probabilities or grossly ineffective methods of contraception, households be-
have as if fertility regulation is outside their control. In such regimes, fertility is left to nature.
How does child survival affect the household’s fertility behavior more generally? Under As-
sumption 1, when ¡ rises, ¢(nt ) is unaffected while ≠(nt ) rises. Hence @n/@¡ < 0 at an inte-
rior optimum and household fertility necessarily falls with ¡. This echoes the standard result
in Beckerian models, for instance, Proposition 1 in Doepke (2005). The more relevant metric
for population movement, however, is the number of surviving children. Define the latter as
zt ¥¡nt and rewrite (11) as








vt ° (øvt +±°1)zt
∏
¥ ≠ˆ(zt ) (12)
where ¥ˆ¥¡¥. Clearly only ¢ˆ(z) depends on¡. Since ¢ˆ(z) is decreasing in z, @z/@¡< 0whenever
@¢ˆ/@¡< 0. The latter requires n to be lower than ¥/2 which obtains for income levels satisfying
vt > (1°±)¡¥(2√+')
ø¡¥(2√+')°2' ¥ v˜(¡) (13)
where ' ¥ 2∞[µ°æ(1°µ)]+∏/2. The threshold, v˜(¡), is decreasing in ¡. Thus, an increase in
¡ makes it more likely that z falls with ¡: households previously at full-income v˜ would now
find themselves above it. Since we have established that @n/@¡< 0 at an interior optimum, this
means at low income levels (vt < v˜) fertility falls less than proportionately when more children
survive.15 Proposition 1 summarizes this discussion and identifies several additional shifters of
household fertility.
Proposition 1 In a Modern Regime – one with quality investment in children – household fertil-
ity, n, is decreasing in full income (v), child rearing costs (ø,±) and the child survival rate (¡), but





on the number of surviving children (z) depends on household full income: z rises
with ¡ for v < v˜(¡) and falls for v > v˜(¡)where v˜(¡) is defined in (13).
To see the effect of full income, note only ≠(nt ) depends on vt and positively: since ≠ is
upward sloping, an increase in full income lowers the fertility choice. Similarly only ¢(nt ) in
equation (11) depends on ∏ and positively. As one would expect, less efficient methods lead to
higher number of childbirths. Similar reasoning shows household fertility falls with ± and ø.
Next, turn to the consumption-fertility tradeoff. From (7) and (8), it follows st = Øc1t which
converts (6) into (1+Ø)c1t = vt (1°ø¡nt )°±¡nt °¡nt xt . For interior x, using (10) in the last
15 v˜ also depends on ∏ (via '); indeed, v˜ is increasing in ∏ implying, given a ¡, the threshold v˜ falls as better
methods of contraception get adopted, making it easier for households to cross it.
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equation, it is easy to check that √c1t = vt ° (øvt +±°1)¡nt where √ ¥ [1+Ø+∞æ(1°µ)]. As-
sumption 1(a) guarantees a tradeoff between c1t and ¡nt ; we’ll have more to say on this below.
Finally, the child quantity-quality tradeoff. Given the optimum level of fertility from equa-










Clearly investment in child quality and surviving fertility move in opposite directions. In con-
junction with Proposition 1, this implies reductions in child mortality lead to an increase in
parental investment in child quality and richer parents investmore in their children thanpoorer
parents. Also, note from Proposition 1 that z falls when ∏ falls whichmeans x rises when ∏ falls.
Investment in child quality rises when parents use more efficient methods of contraception
since they are able to regulate fertility at lower cost. Ceteris paribus, the heightened focus on
child quality becomes more of a rational imperative with either declines in child mortality or
improvements in the contraception technology.
It is instructive to remind ourselves of the standard Beckerian calculus and present a quick
contrast with features of the Modern Regime discussed here. Set º = 0 in (11) and solve for a













/@v < 0 implying both n and z fall with v if ± < 1 (Assumption 1(c)). Using
the just-derived expression for ¡tnt and (10), we derive
x = [æø (1°µ)v + (æ± (1°µ)°µ)]/(µ°æ(1°µ))
implying that x is independent of ¡. It is also easy to check that @x/@v > 0. The implication
is that as incomes rise, investment in child quality rises and fertility falls, the usual Beckerian
quality-quantity trade-off. This means transition out of the Malthusian equilibrium in the con-
ventional Beckermodel is independent of child survival and is purely driven by income growth.
To summarize, in the Modern Regime, households, having adopted deliberate fertility con-
trol, respond to a secular increase in child survival by reducing their fertility. However, only one
group – households with income higher than a threshold v˜ – see a decline in the number of
surviving children and only these families make investments in the quality of their offspring.
The threshold itself falls with¡making it more likely for families to join this group over time. In
short, inside a modern equilibrium, a persistent decline in child mortality can, in and of itself,
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incentivize more andmore families to have fewer but higher quality surviving children.
4.2 Malthusian regime
Such a regime is characterized by xt = 0 and nt <¥. It applies to the eve of the fertility transition
when fertility is high, people are limiting births using less-effective traditional methods but still
not investing much in the quality of their surviving children.16 From (14), it follows





¥z (vt ) . (15)
So positive quality investment (x > 0) occurs whenever vt °z(vt ), an increasing function of vt ,
is positive. This happens for vt > vˆ where the income threshold solves






In short, for vt < vˆ , child quality is absent (Malthusian regime) and when vt crosses vˆ , the
economy enters the Modern regime. From Proposition 1 it follows that for vt < v˜ , the income
threshold vˆ rises with ¡. For vt > v˜ , in contrast, vˆ falls.
Since a closed-form expression for vˆ is unavailable, vˆ cannot be directly compared with v˜
in (13) above. Suppose vt < vˆt so that we are in a Malthusian regime. Substituting &n = 0 and
&x > 0 into the first order conditions yields an equation for optimal fertility choice when the
household does not invest in child quality:










¥ ≠˘(nt ). (17)
We establish Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In a Malthusian regime – which obtains when vt < vˆ – household fertility falls
with the child survival rate (¡) but rises with full income (v). The number of surviving children
rises with the child survival rate (¡) for all income levels satisfying vt < vˆ as long as ø¡¥< 2 and
2∞µ+∏/2< (1+Ø)/(1°ø¡¥/2).
In contrast, in the Modern regime discussed above, that is when vt > vˆ , the number of sur-
viving children rises with the child survival rate but only for the sufficiently poor (vˆ < vt < v˜).
16Long (2006) documents that only half of 6-14 year olds were in school in 1851 and that the average child would
stay in school for roughly five years. School fees, ranging from 1-8 pence per week, were partly to blame for low
school attendance. Opportunity cost in terms of lost wages from child labor was also important. Long argues
that, after the 1870s, compulsory schooling laws “dramatically changed the cost benefit analysis”. While that is no
doubt true, it is our contention that the socio-economic changes we have described also had a lot of influence on
this cost-benefit analysis.
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For the rich (vˆ < vt > v˜) , the number of surviving children falls and investment in their quality
rises.
Finally note that since our focus is on late nineteenth century England, on the eve of and




, to preclude the pos-
sibility of households being at their maximal reproductive capacity in the Malthusian equilib-
rium.
4.3 Fertility transition
A story of the fertility transition is emerging from within the model. Assume households have
adopted some deliberate fertility control and contraceptive technology is what it is, the natural
kind, and does not change. Now suppose a secular decline in child mortality in underway.
Suppose v˜ < vˆ where v˜ is defined in (13) and vˆ in (16). Starting from v0 < v˜ < vˆ and n < ¥,
as v increases, n rises and so does z, with x at zero. Households respond to a secular increase
in child survival by reducing their fertility. When incomes are sufficiently low (v < vˆ), improve-
ments in child mortality raise surviving fertility across the board, even as parents do not invest
in their childrens’ quality. As v increases to above vˆ , households start substituting child quan-
tity for quality – n starts to fall and x rises. An increase in ¡ lowers both n and z.
Suppose, instead, v˜ > vˆ . Starting from v0 < vˆ , an increase in v raises n but there is no qual-
ity investment. As v increases above vˆ , quality investment turns positive. In this regime, an
increase in v lowers n and raises x. An increase in ¡ also lowers n but, again, raises z. Even-
tually as v crosses v˜ , an increase in v lowers n and raises x (as before) but now an increase in
¡ also lowers z (that is, the drop in n is strong enough). Of course, this is all conditional on
the same contraception technology. As ¡ or v becomes large enough, the cost of averting ¥°n
births is high enough that some people start switching to modern contraception. As enough
people do, there is a further sharp drop in n and increase in x.
A reduction in ∏, the effectiveness of contraception, amplifies the effect of income on fer-
tility and child quality investment. This implies, for example, that historically income had a
weak causal effect on the two and, hence, the fertility transition had to wait for the contracep-
tion revolution. In modern day developing societies where knowledge and supply of modern
contraception is more prevalent, in contrast, income becomes the binding constraint.
4.4 Intertemporal Equilibrium
Turn now to the dynamic equilibrium of this economy. We reinstate the i (household) and j
(contraception choice) subscripts and allow aggregate productivity A to grow exogenously at
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rate g . Assuming competitive factor markets, the equilibrium wage and rental rates are
wt =
°
1°µ¢Atkµt and Ωt =µAtkµ°1t (18)
where kt ¥ Kt/Ht . For full depreciation of physical capital, the interest factor is Rt = Ωt . We
define a Malthusian and a Modern equilibrium. In a Malthusian (Modern) equilibrium, every
household i finds itself in a Malthusian (Modern) regime. In addition, certain market-clearing
conditions apply. Given the initial distribution of full incomeG0(vi0) defined over [vmin,1),
Definition 1 (Malthusian equilibrium) Every household i is in aMalthusian equilibriumwhen




1 satisfies (17), x
i
t = 0, and Assumption 1 is satisfied, for
a given j . In this case, Kt =
R
st°1 (vt°1) dGt°1(vt°1) and Ht =
R
" "adG (") and (18) holds.
Definition 2 (Modern equilibrium) Every household i is in aModern equilibriumwhen vit > vˆt




1 satisfies (11), x
i
t > 0 and given by (14), and Assumption 1 is sat-
isfied, for a given j . In this case, Kt =
R




" "qt (vt°1) dG(v)dG (")
and (18) holds.
Steady-state fertility is given by a time-invariant long-run distribution of household-specific
fertilities, ni1, characterized by (17) in a Malthusian equilibrium and by (11) in a Modern equi-
librium. The total fertility rate (TFR) at date t is given by the average fertility rate at that date:R






Our definition of the two equilibria precludes the possibility that some households invest in
child quality while others do not. That is, in any equilibrium, all households either have x = 0
or they all have x > 0. In our computational work later, we allow for a “mixed” equilibrium in
light of the evidence discussed in footnote 16.
5 Fertility Control and the Diffusion of Technologies
So far we have looked at contraception equilibria under three assumptions: the child survival
rate is constant, households have access to only one kind of contraception method and labor
productivity is constant in the long run. Together these imply the economy eventually gravitates
to one of two types of stationary equilibria, high or low fertility.
The salience of these assumptions for the fertility transition will be clearer from Figure 2.
Our specification of costly contraception implies non-homothetic preferences. In Figure 2a,
drawn in (ct ,nt ) space after substituting in optimal decisions for quality investment and saving,
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the income expansion path (IEP) is non-monotonic. The kink in the IEP occurs at a full-income
income level where parents are indifferent about whether or not to invest in child quality. Be-
low this income level, increases in income increase family size. Above, the effect of income is
negative as richer households substitute towards child quality.
Figure 2b shows how the IEP responds to a change in the child survival rate ¡ while Figure
2c illustrates the response to a change in contraceptive effectiveness (∏). A lower value of ∏, by
making it easier to implement a given fertility plan, has an effect similar to a higher ¡ on the
IEP. The budget lines have been drawn to give an idea how tradeoffs change with income. For
a lower value ∏, the kink occurs at a lower income level (Figure 2d): parents start substituting
away from child quantity at a lower income level when it is easier for them to afford the cost of
contraception.
For more effective contraception methods (lower ∏), a given increase in e reduces child-
births by more which, in turn, enables parents to direct resources towards child quality. For a
given contraception method, a higher survival rate (higher ¡) raises the net marginal benefit of
fertility control. The benefit from surviving children does not change but the cost of “excessive”
fertility rises since parents may end up with too many survivors.
These figures illustrate the demand for children falls when household full income or child
survival improve sufficiently. The negative relationship between fertility and income or child
survival becomesmore pronounced at higher income levels andmore effectivemethods of con-
traception ease the ability of households to achieve their fertility targets (Figure 3(d), dotted line
corresponds to a more efficient technology).
As per the historical evidence discussed in Section 2, the transition to a modern fertility
regime is accompanied bymarital fertility control through the active use of birth control strate-
gies. Obviously households switch to a more efficient and possibly costlier contraception strat-
egy only if perceived returns from it are high. Comparative statics results discussed above point
to two potential causes for such a transition, improvements in income and child survival. The
transitionwould be facilitated by households switching towardsmore effectivemethods of con-
traception. Moreover, our model predicts richer households will switch towards modern con-
traception first, and that they will have smaller families during and after the transition (reverse
in pre-transition Malthusian equilibrium).
In Section 6 we show that even though productivity levels in England were steadily improv-
ing due to technological change, improvements in late nineteenth century child survival were
more decisive than income growth in shifting the social balance towards conscious control of
marital fertility. The remainder of this section formalizes this social change as a switch fromone
(less effective) technology to another (more effective) and the diffusion of that choice through
the population over time.
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Initially, after child mortality falls sufficiently, richer households find it advantageous to
switch to modern methods of contraception despite high social and informational costs. Even
if this decision were to have no social impact, a steady decrease in child mortality alone would
make this switch more and more desirable for households down the socio-economic ladder.
Changes in social attitudes accentuate this process in line with the historical evidence. Specifi-
cally, the abatement of stigma associated with “unconventional” fertility regulation and the dif-
fusion of knowledge aboutmodernmethods of contraceptionmade it advantageous for house-
holds from lower socio-economic status to practice fertility regulation sooner than they would
have.
Recall the first of the two contraception technologies, j 2 {1,2}, is identified as the traditional
one, the second as modern. Specifically we assume 0∑ ∏2 < ∏1 and the fixed costs of adoption
satisfy 0 = Æ1t < Æ2t ¥ Æt initially, before technology 2 is being used. Denote household i ’s
indirect utility for the choice of the traditional technology 1 as Ui1t ¥ V i1t and utility for the
modern technology 2 as V i2t ¥Ui2t °Æt .
While the effectiveness with which contraceptives can avert childbirth underlies the param-
eter ∏, we introduce two types of fixed costs to adopting the more effective modern technol-
ogy. Suppose Æt consists of an information cost ÆIt and a social cost Æ
S
t . Both are endogenous
and depend on network externalities. Part of the cost of switching to modern contraception
in traditional societies is obviously the lack of reliable information about how to regulate fer-
tility and how to avail of the necessary inputs. The availability of such information as well as
supply of these inputs depend on how extensively the modern technology is used. Hence we
posit that the information cost depends on an inter-temporal network externality non-linearly,
ÆIt =Æ0(1°pt°1)Æ1 , Æ0,Æ1 > 0, where pt°1 2 [0,1] is the proportion of the prior generation who
used modern contraception. The more widely used it was, the more accessible the technology
is now. The second element of the switching cost comes from social behavior. As we discussed
in Section 2, conscious fertility control in a traditional society is fraught with social repercus-
sions. We assume someone deviating from the traditional norm attracts social censure. The
more prevalent the use of the modern contraception technology is, the less will its adoption be
viewed as radical.
Suppose once a household chooses either the traditional or themodern contraception tech-
nology, the choice is irreversible. Inmaking that choice, households take into account the social
disapproval and religious opposition they may encounter from being more progressive. More
concretely, suppose each household randomly socializes with another member of his cohort
during his youth. The household’s social payoff from this interaction is determined by its and
its social partner’s reproductive choices. This social payoff is ≥∏ 0, when both households have
adopted the modern technology. Similar to Munshi and Myaux (2006), ≥ denotes the intrinsic
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utility the household receives from the modern contraception technology. Should the social
partner be a traditionalist, on the other hand, a modern household receives the payoff ≥° ª
where ª > 0 is the social disapproval it attracts for straying away from “traditional principles”.
The household’s payoff in the other two cases is normalized to zero.
Household i anticipates a pt proportion of people adopt the modern technology and forms
expectations of her net utility from the two technologies. If i sticks with the traditional technol-
ogy, this utility is V i1t =Ui1t . If i switches it is V i2t =Ui2t °Æt where
Æt =ÆIt +ÆSt =Æ0(1°pt°1)Æ1 + [(1°pt )ª°≥].
Household i will switch to themodern technology at t as long as¢Uit ¥Ui2t °Ui1t ∏Æt . Appendix
B shows that ¢Uit is increasing in v
i
t . This means, given the expected pt and historical pt°1
there is a threshold income level v§t such that individuals above this threshold are better-off
switching to the modern technology. Higher the (expected) adoption rate of this technology at
t and higher the past adoption rate, lower is the threshold income level. Given the distribution






We incorporate this social dynamics into the fertility choice model of Sections 3–5 and proceed
to study their role in the fertility transition.
6 Numerical Experiments
To what extent did child mortality and contraception account for the English fertility transi-
tion of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? To answer this question, we begin
by assigning parameter values to the model so that, on certain margins, it resembles England
before and after the fertility transition. Before the transition, all households are assumed to use
traditional methods of contraception, afterwards they all use the modern one.
To better understand the time frame, consider Table 1. Child mortality (probability of death
in the first five years of life) shows a discernible downward trend after 1870 as does the total
fertility rate. Consequently we treat 1870 as the onset of the English mortality and fertility tran-
sitions.17
17Data is for the end-point of a time interval unless noted otherwise. Fertility decline lags mortality declines by
about five years, but that is not discernible in our time interval of 25 years. Mortality data comes frommortality.org,
fertility data from Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Birth Statistics: Historical Series of Statistics from
Registrations of Births in England andWales 1837-1983, series FM1, no. 13, London, HerMajesty’s Stationery Office
(1987) and from E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield’s The population history of England 1541-1871: A Reconstruction,
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Period ChildMortality TFR
1845-70 0.28 4.67 (1861)
1870-95 0.22 4.04 (1891)
1895-1920 0.15 2.42 (1916)
1920-1945 0.06 2.04
1945-70 0.03 2.40
Table 1: Child Mortality and Total Fertility
It is important to note the pre-transition economy we simulate here is not the Malthusian
equilibrium of our model. In our Malthusian equilibrium, household income and fertility rates
are positively correlated. Clark (2005, 2007) discusses how English society in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries exhibited this positive association but, by the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the rich were having fewer children. Moreover, literacy and school enrollment rates were
steadily rising during the nineteenth century (Long, 2006). To resemble the pre-transition econ-
omy, we pick parameter values so as to match aggregate child education data in 1870 as well as
ensure, for households investing in child quality (the relatively affluent), fertility is negatively
related to household full income.
Secondly, in the data, the TFR drops below replacement during the 1930s (effect of WWI)
and rises above it soon after WWII (baby boom). Since our model is not tailored to study these
temporary shifts, we treat 1945 as the end of the transition and the post-transition TFR is set to
2.05 (1.0 in model terms).
6.1 Parameter Values
Table 2 lists values for the parameters of the model. We assume the modern contraception
technology is highly efficient; it can costlessly implement a household’s fertility target when
everyone uses it.
Each period of adulthood is taken to be 25 years, childhood to be 15 years. The subjective
discount rate Ø follows from the standard quarterly rate of 0.99 compounded over 25 years.
µ, the weight on child quantity has to exceed 0.5 to satisfy Assumption 1(b); it is set to 0.55.
The intensity of warm-glow altruism, ∞, is picked to match post-transition TFR. Specifically, for







London, Edward Arnold (1981).
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Preference Fertility Production
Ø= 0.37 ¥= 3.585 a = 0.445
∞= 0.45 ø= 0.09 æ= 0.47
µ = 0.55 ±= 0.001 √= 1.35
¡= 0.72 ∏1 = 1.685 µ= 0.23
∏2 = 0 A0 = 141




Table 2: Parameter Values
where household fertility choice is decreasing in full income vt .18 As ¡! 1 and vt !1 (when







which is independent of household income. Given other parameter values, ∞ is chosen so that
this TFR is 2.05. Finally the child survival rate is calibrated based on the child mortality rate
data in Table 1: 0.28 prior to the transition, zero after the transition is complete.
The natural fecundity ¥ depends on biological capacity as well as social constructs such as
age at marriage and celibacy. Demographers often rely on data for the Hutterites who were
perceived to practice little fertility regulation and had 10 children on average. Woods (2000)
argues against blindly adopting this number for English natural fecundity, estimating it to be
7.17 instead (see also Guinnane et al., 1994). This is the value (or 3.585 per model agent) used
in our simulations. Haveman andWolf (1995) report the opportunity cost of child rearing to be
15% of parental time. Scaled to the 15 years of childhood, this gives ø= 0.09. The resource cost
of children, ±, is a scaling parameter and its value is set as perDoepke (2004). The contraception
cost parameters (ª,≥,Æ0,Æ1) pertain to the transition, that is, 1870-1945. We discuss how they
are calibrated later.





Normalizing mean ability to unity implies "= (√°1)/√. Since reliable data on lifetime income
18The expected number of surviving children is independent of ¡. This means the modern technology alone
cannot generate a fertility transition from the child mortality transition.
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inequality in nineteenth century England is not available, we cannot directly calibrate this dis-
persion parameter. In any case our goal is not to explain inequality, only to broadly capture the
cross-sectional correlation between income and fertility behavior. Hence we use √, æ (elastic-
ity of earnings with respect to education) and a (productivity of quality investment) to generate
plausible quality investment in children, specifically that at least 60% of children receive edu-
cation in the pre-transition economy. Lindert (2004) reports that 60.9% of children of ages 5-14
were in private and public schools in England & Wales in 1870 (Table 5.1) while, according to
Long (2006), 45% of 5 years olds and 60% of 6 year olds were in school in 1851. In practice this
target schooling rate is matched mainly by adjusting the parameters √ and æ with a serving as
a scaling parameter. We note that the implied returns to schooling is modest, consistent with
values used in this literature.
The value for µ comes from Clark’s (2007, Table 10.1) estimate of capital’s share in British
income during 1960-2000. For the growth rate of TFP, g , we rely on Maddison’s (2001, Table
A1-c) estimates of British GDP per capita during 1820-1950. The average annual growth rate
of per capita income during this period was 1.08% per year. In other words, income per capita
increased by a factor of 4 over 1820°1950. We calibrate g to be 3.15% per generation so that we
match this increase in income per capita over 1820°1945. Initial productivity A0 is normalized
to match the pre-transition GDP per capita reported in Maddison (2001).
Now turn to the contraception cost parameters that govern the fertility transition during
1870° 1945. Two types of evidence are available, neither perfect. The first, direct evidence,
comes from surveys on family limitation. The eminent source is the Lewis-Faning (1949) survey
of English women which finds that 15% of thosemarried before 1910 used birth control, 58% of
those married during 1920-24 did, while 55% of those married in 1940-47 did. The last number
is certain to be biased downwards: the surveywas completed in 1946-47when the 1940-47mar-
riage cohort would not have completed its target fertility (parity) and, hence, unlikely to have
fully adopted contraception. Based on contraception practice rates of the previous cohorts,
Lewis-Fanning estimates this to be around 70%. Even that number is biased downwards since
contraception was steadily becoming popular with each successive cohort. There are other
problems with the survey. Besides the small sample size – 3281 respondents across marriage
cohorts – we would expect reporting bias: women would have been reticent to talk about such
matters to surveyors or they might not have knownmuch since birth control was largely a male
decision before the advent of the pill. Notably, Lewis-Faning also reports contraception rates
were correlated with socio-economic status: more women from wealthier occupations were
relying on it.
The second type of evidence is indirect, based on the Coale-Trussel method of inferring
the extent of fertility regulation based on educated guesses about natural fertility and observed
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marital fertility rates for a population. Woods (2000, Table 4.2) extends prior work in this area
on England and estimates the index of family limitation to have gone from 0.013 (1871) to 0.171
(1891) to 0.842 (1922) to 1.036 (1933). In practice this index is not the same as the proportion
of households contracepting. In our model, though, there is a close link between the fertility
ratio nit/¥ (the variable Ig in the Coale-Trussel method, corresponding to the number of births
to married women to the total births to those women if they were subject to maximum fertil-
ity) and contraception strategy (∏): a reduction in the latter through the use of modern con-
traception reduces the former. In other words, in the context of our model, the proportion of
households regulating fertility maps to the index of family limitation.
The Coale-Trussel evidence, as extended byWoods (2000), does not face the response prob-
lems of the Lewis-Fanning survey. It does, however, have one drawback for us: no distinction
is made between households who were adopting traditional methods like coitus interruptus for
the first time and those that were shifting towards more obviously modern appliance-based
methods. To the extent adoption of traditional methods for the first time was associated with a
better awareness of the process of procreation, it can be argued the very usage of those meth-
ods was modern. More importantly, appliances were rare in the late nineteenth century: some,
such as condoms and spermicides, had just started being mass produced but were not widely
available for ordinary people, others like diaphragmswere popularized later.19 It is also the case
the withdrawal method, one of two traditional method widely used during the transition, has
an effectiveness only slightly worse than condoms (e.g., see Guinnane et al. 1994) while absti-
nence, the other method, is arguably costlier to follow but as effective. With these caveats in
mind, we proceed to use Woods’ estimates to impute that the proportion of households prac-
ticing modern contraception went from 0% (1871) to 17.1% (1891) to 84.3% (1922) to 100% by
1933. Since the English fertility transition starts around 1870, these imply modern contracep-
tion usage of 17.1% in the first period of transition (by 1895), 84.3% in the second period (by
1920) and 100% in the third period (by 1945).20
To replicate the mortality and fertility transitions in Table 1, we “shock” the model by the
mortality transition period T (1870-95) onwards and trace the model’s prediction about the
TFR period T onwards. For this fertility transition we need to calibrate the information cost
(Æ0,Æ1) and social cost parameters (≥,ª). We choose these four parameters to best fit four pieces
of evidence: the switch towards modern contraception does not start until period T and the
adoption rates are 17%, 84.3% and 100% in periods T , T + 1 and T + 2. Since each period’s
19Seccombe (1990) notes that marital fertility control among working classes was achieved by more induced
abortions, withdrawal method, deliberate abstention from intercourse and use of contraceptive devices.
20A prior version of this paper used the Lewis-Fanning estimates, assuming the actual practice of contraception
by 1945 was close to 100%. Key results were similar to what we present here, including the relative importance of
child mortality over income growth in explaining the fertility transition.
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workforce gets a fresh draw from the ability distribution, we choose these parameter values so
that mean adoption rates (across 20 rounds of simulation) match their empirical counterparts.
6.2 Simulation Results
Start with the upper panel of Figure 4 that reports the proportion of households adopting the
modern contraceptionmethod over time. The solid line corresponds to themodel’s prediction,
the dotted to actual data. The two are very closely aligned, not surprising given the calibration
strategy. The grey band represents a “95% confidence interval”, computed as the sample mean
± 1.96 £ the sample standard deviation across 20 rounds of simulation. The lower panel of





transition. It remains steady and suggests, given the calibration strategy, that social costs was
slightly more important in accounting for the shift towards modern methods of contraception.
Fertility Transition
How well does the model’s predicted fertility transition match the evidence? This is reported in
Figure 5 for the transition period of T +1 to T +3 (1870°1945): the solid black line is the pre-
dicted path of the TFR, the dashed red line is the data. The predicted path is quite close to the
data though the fit is less than perfect in the third period of the transition when predicted TFR
is 25% higher than replacement and 29% higher than actual. To understand the explanatory
power of this model, consider Doepke’s (2005) evaluation of the mortality-fertility link in the
Becker model. Doepke studies three versions, a model with continuous fertility choice and no
child survival uncertainty (standard Becker model), one with precautionary demand for chil-
dren and discrete fertility choice and one with sequential fertility decision in the precautionary
model. All three models assume Barro-Becker altruism. None of these models come close to
matching observed fertility declines in England based on child/infant mortality declines. The
Becker model without survival uncertainty and separate costs per childbirth and per surviving
child, in particular, generates a relatively small reduction in the TFR and a small increase in the
NFR.21 That ourmodel can account for asmuch as 71-75%of the English total fertility transition
by 1945, suggests that incorporating the cost of birth control during the transition substantially
improves the Becker model’s explanatory power.
Two other points about Figure 5 should be noted. First, the transition to replacement does
not complete until another two generations in the model. Recall we set the post-1945 TFR in
England andWales somewhat artificially to replacement; replacement was not actually reached
21The precautionary demand model is able to account for TFR and NFR declines under extreme assumptions:
close-to-linear utility from consumption and exceptionally high precautionary motive with respect child survival
uncertainty.
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until 1970 (that is, corresponding to period T +5 in the model). Moreover the post-transition
modelwas calibrated under the assumptionhousehold full income v!1. Hence, that the sim-
ulated transition takes longer to converge to replacement is not a serious shortcoming. While
the model does well in capturing how the fertility transition unfolded, it is not tailored to ex-
plain why English fertility fell below replacement after WWI and then overshot replacement in
the decades following WWII (Figure 1).
Note also, by design, the model is calibrated to reproduce the observed TFR in period T . In
the data, TFR was steadily falling since the early nineteenth century. While themodel does pre-
dict a steady decline, it does not predict as big of a decline as we see in the data. Demographers
believe the early nineteenth century declinewas drivenmainly by the extensivemarginwhich is
missing from our model. In addition, the pre- and post-1841 TFR data come from two different
sources – see Figure 1 – and the year for which they overlap (1841) shows a large discrepancy
between the two sources. Both data sets point towards some decline in the early nineteenth
century. The more pronounced decline, though, occurs after 1870.
Hence, on the basis of Figure 4, we conclude that the model provides a good description of
the factors underlying the English total fertility transition.
The role of income growth and contraception
Our theory goes beyond the claim that the mortality transition can explain the English fertility
transition. Income too has an effect on fertility: as England became steadily prosperous over
the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this would have lowered the TFR inde-
pendently of themortality transition.22 How relevant was thismargin for the English transition?
Did the contraception revolution play a pivotal role?
Consider two counterfactual scenarios. To isolate the importance of income growth, we
maintain ¡ at its 1870 value of 0.72 and simulate the time path of the TFR, allowing contracep-
tion adoption to change from theCoale-Trussel-Woods estimates. A second counterfactual asks
whether the switch to more efficient methods of contraception and their falling costs account
for much of the transition. For this we set Æ0 sufficiently high so that no household switches to
the modern method during the periods T +1 to T +3. These scenarios are presented in Figure
6. Since we do not recalibrate the model in either scenario to match the observed adoption of
modern contraception, for comparability we present amodified version of the benchmark case
wheremortality alone changes exogenouslywhile TFP growth is held to zero from1870 onwards
(that is, whatever income growth occurs comes from the endogenous accumulation of human
22This prediction about income growth is at variance with conventional thinking among demographers, but
related to Galor’s work where technological progress improves the valuation of education, causing households to
shift from child quantity to quality.
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and physical capital).
The solid orange line in Figure 6 (solid black and dashed red lines represent the same series
as in Figure 5) presents this modified benchmark case – evidently the lack of TFP growth does
not drastically alter the model’s predictive power. The blue dotted line represents the path of
the TFR when child mortality does not change, while the green dash-dotted line corresponds
to the no-switch scenario. In these two alternative scenarios, even five generations after the
fertility transition started, the TFR remains higher than 3. By the third period of the transition,
the predicted TFR is more than twice the replacement level and 70% higher than the baseline
prediction. In other words, while income growth has a significant impact on fertility behavior,
its impact on the English fertility transition is less so.
It is not surprising when switching costs are too high (dash-dotted line), the TFR decline is
also relatively small compared to what we observe during the historical transition. Here, how-
ever, the model predicts a faster TFR transition relative to the income-only scenario, indicat-
ing again the relative importance of the child mortality transition. Fertility remains 74% (38%)
higher than replacement (baseline prediction) by T +3 in this case.
Net fertility
Finally turn to Figure 7 which shows predicted and actual net fertility during 1841-1945. A cen-
tral prediction of our model is that a decline in child mortality also lowers the NFR. The dashed
line at the bottom represents the data, the NRR2 series reported in Figure 1. The solid black line
represents the predicted path of NFR from themodel, computed as ¡n assuming boys and girls
faced the same survival rate, an assumption consistent with the evidence (Hinde, 2003, Table
12.1). Since the model ignores mortality for women during their reproductive years, we overes-
timate net fertility. But the general trend predicted for 1845°1945 closely follows the data. This
is not so for the two counterfactual scenarios. For the constant mortality scenario (blue dotted
line), we have seen from Figure 6 that income growth alone does not lower the TFR by much
and we see here the predicted NFR barely moves. For the scenario where households do not
switch to modern contraception (green dash-dotted line), the predicted NFR behaves similarly
and even shows a slight increase: evidently mortality change and income growth together are
not enough to substantially lower the TFR to compensate for the higher child survival rate.
We conclude on the basis of these results that contraception costs and the social change that
accompanied the shift towards fertility regulation were important elements of the English fer-
tility transition. Contraception alone could not have triggered the transition. It was the catalyst,
and a powerful one at that, in the change unleashed by the mortality transition.
33
7 Conclusion
In much of Europe, dramatic declines in both mortality and fertility started in the late nine-
teenth century, a phenomenon that later came to be known as the demographic transition. In
most instances, mortality decline preceded fertility decline. We argue, the former incentivized
the latter. As child mortality declines, the procreation process, if left unfettered, produces “too
many” surviving children. At that point, modern contraception becomes a way for families to
economize on costly children and free up resources for their upkeep and quality. Richer house-
holds are the first to regulate marital fertility and, in doing so, kindle a process of indirect diffu-
sion that gradually lowers fertility across socio-economic groups. In our story, mortality decline
is the principal instigator that necessitates a culture of conscious contraception which, in turn,
becomes the facilitator of fertility reductions.
But that is only part of the story. The latter part of the nineteenth century is also a period
of rapid social, economic and cultural change brought on, in part, by impressive increases in
living standards and improvements in nutrition and health. Surely, these too shaped fertility
demand and acted as important catalysts of reproductive change. Our story is not blind to these
alternative explanations and allows for the possibility that rapid income growth, even in the
absence of precipitious mortality declines or massive uptake of modern contraception,may, in
and of itself, bring about a fertility transition. For the historical setting of England and Wales,
though, if our numerical results are any indication, income was a less salient factor relative to
child mortality. That is not to say income, or more broadly structural change, could not have
been more instrumental in other historical or current episodes.23
Demographic transitions are underway even to this day with almost every nation witness-
ing deep declines in child mortality andmarital fertility. World population growth has declined
rapidly since the 1960s; the world TFR has fallen from 5.0 births per woman during her life-
time in the early 1950s to 2.5 births in 2010, a remarkable decline of 50%. Women in developing
countries – sub-Saharan Africa is an exception – transitioned fromhaving around six births dur-
ing their lifetime to having closer to two births. Does our work have anything to say about these
modern transitions? In a recent study using Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from 65
countries in different years between 1988 and 2005, Canning et al (2013) find the following. In
high-fertility countries, those in the early stages of the transition, desired fertility may exceed
actual fertility, so that broader socioeconomic changes that affect desired fertility have little im-
pact on observed fertility.24 Interestingly, they also find that effects of social learning about the
23Demographers have long been skeptical of a simple, universally valid model of fertility change (see Mason,
1997).
24Desired fertility counts only births of women who say they want another birth, with an adjustment for incom-
plete childbearing. It is not based on ex post statements about children being wanted. Note also that in ourmodel,
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fertility calculus of others, and social spillovers more generally, is strongest in the early stages.
To the extent early stages of modern transitions look like their counterparts in historical tran-
sitions, the Canning et al (2013) study lends credence to the timelessness of the main mecha-
nisms underlying fertility change in our model.
And what of the importance of the contraception revolution in modern transitions? Surely,
access to and information regarding effectivemeans of birth control are not stumbling blocks in
the lives of modern couples. Researchers have documented the widespread, secular increase in
the use of contraception, due in part to vastly improved access to modern methods. Economic
demographers, however, remain skeptical of their importance, notwithstanding Easterly’s ear-
lier work, in explaining modern fertility transitions. Their skepticism has been reinforced by
Pritchett’s (1994) influential study that finds 90% of cross-country differences in the level of the
TFR to be explained by differences in women’s reported desired fertility alone. In other words,
the means to achieve that desired fertility, contraception for instance, plays a minor role. This
conclusion has been recently questioned by Lam (2011) in his presidential address to the an-
nual meeting of the Population Association of America. Lam uses data from 185 DHS surveys
for 74 countries, a considerably larger set of surveys than Pritchett used. He looks at changes
in desired and actual TFR. While desired fertility fell by an average of 0.038 births per year, the
TFR fell by 0.060 births: 47% of the average decline in the TFR came from better ways to achieve
fertility targets. Our theory can rationalize these seemingly contradictory findings. Conditional
on a contraception method, all changes in the TFR come from changes in desired fertility (due
to income growth and better child survival). Over time, changes in the availability and adoption
of alternative, more efficient, methods account for a significant part of TFR declines. The onset
of the fertility decline, though, stems from factors other than the availability of contraceptives.
as in the standard Becker model, all fertility is desired.
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Appendix
A Second Order Condition
Since the budget constraint can become non-convex with quality and quantity, we check sec-
ond order conditions. To that end, use the optimality conditions for s and x to express utility as
a function of n alone (ignoring non-relevant terms):
V (nt )ª= [1+Ø+∞(1°µ)] ln
£
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§2 ° ∞(2µ°1)(nt )2 ° ∏¥ < 0 if µ > 1/2.
B ¢U is increasing in v
For a given fertility choice, n, suppose optimal consumption and child quality decisions are
c1(n), c2(n) and x(n). Doing so and substituting these into the utility function allows us to ex-
press the household’s objective function in terms of n alone. Obviously, given a j technology,
@U/@n = 0 at the optimum. We have already established that @n/@v < 0 whenever child qual-
ity investment is positive, which is the case we consider in Section 7. Now we need to show
@¢U/@v > 0. Since 0∑ ∏2 < ∏1, it is sufficient to prove as ∏ rises,U (v) becomes flatter. That is,
we need to show @2U/@∏@v = @2U/@v@∏< 0 sinceU is continuous in ∏ and v .









































is negative since n ∑ ¥while @n/@v < 0.
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